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DANGEROUS RELATIONS: DOCTORS AND
EXTRACORPOREAL EMBRYOS, THE
NEED FOR NEW LIMITS TO
MEDICAL INQUIRY
What is man that thou are mindful of him, and the son of man,
that thou dost care for him?
For thou hast made him little less than God, and dost crown
him with glory and honor.
Psalms 8:4-5
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the birth of Louise Brown on July 25, 1978,1 the science of in vitro
fertilization (IVF) has been hailed as a remedy for infertility.2 It is estimated
that between ten and twenty percent of couples desiring to have children are
unable to do so because of infertility.3 The number of potential candidates
for IVF increases when one includes those couples seeking to modify their
procreative choices out of concern for passing on deleterious inherited
traits.4 Although the current lucrative market in IVF therapy was created
in response to a compelling human need, 5 it does not address the biological
1. R. SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 214 (1981) (first recorded "test tube baby").
2. In vitro fertilization literally means "fertilization in glass." EMBRYO EXPERIMENTA-
TION xiii (P. Singer, H. Kuhse, S. Buckle, K. Dawson & P. Kasimba eds. 1990) [hereinafter
EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION]. In spite of the low success rate for IVF, childless couples cling
to the talismanic image of this therapy. Today, there is a success-rate between only 11%- 14%.
Smith, Assisted Noncoital Reproduction: A Comparative Analysis, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 21, 21
(1990). Therefore, any perceived conclusion that IVF presents a viable remedy for infertility
appears to be based on factors more directly affected by the demands of infertile persons to
have children. See generally Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, External Human Fertilization:
An Evaluation of Policy, 222 SCi. 127 (1983).
3. D. GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 628 (1988).
4. Id. This procedure is referred to as Artificial Insemination, Donor (AID), and is
usually achieved by "impregnating the woman with semen from a man not her husband in a
simple procedure that can be accomplished with a syringe." Wadlington, Artificial Conception:
The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 468 (1983) (footnote omitted). This
procedure is often carried out in conjunction with IVF. Id. at 474. These modem technolo-
gies also raise the specter of creating genetically superior humans as opposed to avoiding con-
genital defects. See Chen, Sperm Bank Donors All Nobel Winners, L.A. Times, Feb. 29, 1980,
at 1, col. 1.
5. Professor Harry D. Krause has stated that "a child is not medication to be prescribed
lightly to frustrated parents." Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM.
L.Q. 185, 206 (1985). Yet, all indicators are that the procedure is widely used. The cost for an
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causes of infertility.6
As recently as 1983, IVF was considered an experimental procedure.7
Even with all its modem permutations and advances,8 IVF only bypasses a
physical incapability that may exist in either the woman or the man.9 While
circumventing infertility through assisted reproduction can be rewarding for
the heretofore infertile couple, realizing their dream of conceiving a child
who shares their exact genetic makeup, 0 IVF therapy creates an immediate
conflict in the context of doctor-patient relationships because the medical
IVF procedure per prospective parent is between $4,500 and $6,000 with an estimated annual
cost to all participating American couples of between $400 million and $500 million. D. GIE-
SEN, supra note 3, at 629 n. 1.
6. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 629 ("Ever willing to accommodate, medical science
views not only the cause of infertility as a medical disorder, but its effect, namely childlessness,
as a disease in need of cure.").
7. For a discussion of the advances in ovarian retrieval through laparoscopy and super-
ovulatory drugs and in the development of improved freezing/storage techniques, see generally
Butler, Holzman, Padilla, McDonough & Boldt, In Vitro Fertilization and Birth After Ul-
trasonically Guided Transurethral Aspiration of Oocytes, 80 S. MED. J. 659 (1987); Frydman,
Rainhorn, Forman, Belaisch-Allart, Fernandez, Lassalle & Testart, Programmed Oocyte Re-
trieval During Routine Laparoscopy and Embryo Cryopreservation for Later Transfer, 155 AM.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 112 (1986); Pace-Owens, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer, 14 J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING, 445 (6 Supp. 1985); Ray-
mond, Fertility Specialists Seeking Better Recipe for In Vitro Fertilization, 259 J. A.M.A. 2060
(1988); Schulman, Dorfmann, Jones, Pitt, Joyce & Patton, Outpatient In Vitro Fertilization
Using Transvaginal Ultrasound-Guided Oocyte Retrieval, 69 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 665
(1987); Torode, Picker, Robertson, Porter, O'Neill & Saunders, Initial Results With Trans-
vaginal, Ultrasonically-Guided Oocyte Pick-up in an Australian In-Vitro Fertilization Pro-
gramme, 144 MED. J. AUSTL. 613 (1986); Trounson & Mohr, Human Pregnancy Following
Cryopreservation, Thawing and Transfer of an Eight-Cell Embryo, 305 NATURE 707 (1983);
Wiseman, Short, Pattinson, Taylor, Nicholson, Elliot, Fleetham & Mortimer, Oocyte Retrieval
in an In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer Program: Comparison of Four Methods, 173 RA-
DIOLOGY 99 (1989).
8. Hull, Magyer, Vasquez, Hayes & Moghissi, Experience with IntraUterine Insemina-
tion for Cervical Factor and Oligospermia, 154 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1333,
1337-38 (1986); Luber, Beeson, Kennedy, Villanueva & Young, Results of Microsurgical Treat-
ment of Tubal Infertility and Early Second-Look Laparoscopy in the Post-Pelvic Inflammatory
Disease Patient: Implications for In Vitro Fertilization, 154 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL-
OGY 1264, 1265, 1267-68 (1986).
9. D. CUSINE, NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES 6-7 (1988). Among the problems
facing infertile men is the failure of spermatogenesis, which may take the form of oligospermia
(sub-fertility), azoospermia (absence of sperm), and necrospermia (dead sperm). Problems as-
sociated with impotence and blockage of the vas deferens may also be circumvented by IVF
without resort to donor sperm. The woman who has a fallopian or cervical blockage is also a
candidate for IVF therapy. Id. at 7. For the sake of this Comment, reference will be made for
simplicity to the married couple who uses IVF therapy by donating their own sperm and
ovaries. There are a host of possibilities that can exist when using one or more donated ga-
metes. For an informative and easy to understand treatise on the many varieties and combina-
tions of reproductive technology, see generally D. CUSINE, supra.
10. See generally Ubell, You Don't Have to be Childless, PARADE. Jan. 14. 1990. at 14.
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community refuses to acknowledge responsibility for the potential life that
results from the IVF process."'
Writing in 1972, when in vitro fertilization technology had yet to pass
from the purely experimental to the medically acceptable, 12 Leon R. Kass, a
leading ethicist and physician, predicted that the issue of defining "pro-
tectible life" would dominate "ethical questions surrounding attempts to
generate a normal child by transferring a laboratory-grown human embryo
into the uterus of an infertile woman."1 3 In attempting to "solve" infertility,
an IVF-created embryo is inevitably treated as an object or commodity for
use by the medical community. This "trivialization"' 4 of human life is re-
flected in a 1989 General Accounting Office (GAO) study of human embryo
laboratories.' 5 According to the GAO study, it is standard practice for the
number of embryos "produced during an IVF treatment cycle" to exceed the
number "immediately replaced in the patient," with eighty-three percent of
the surveyed facilities freezing these excess embryos for storage.16 Unfortu-
nately, forty-one percent of the laboratories eventually destroy these excess
embryos, while thirty-six percent use them for research or "diagnostic pur-
poses."' 7 While some commentators argue that the benefits of IVF may jus-
tify the practices described above,' 8 there is a very real danger that
11. This conflict is exemplified in the text of the American Medical Association's (AMA)
1989 Principles of Medical Ethics and Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 189 (R. Gorlin ed. 1990). Sec-
tion 2.14, addressing the issue of IVF, is composed of two paragraphs. The first paragraph
states that "any fertilized egg that has the potential for human life and that will be implanted
in the uterus of a woman should not be subjected to laboratory research." Id. at 199. The
statement appears to define clearly a relationship between the doctor and the embryo. How-
ever, paragraph two sanctions research on those "fertilized ova not utilized for implantation,"
with the physician admonished to adhere to the principles outlined in § 2.10 covering fetal
research. Id. The third guideline of § 2.10 states: "In fetal research projects, the investigator
should demonstrate the same care and concern for the fetus as a physician providing fetal care
or treatment in a non-research setting." Id. at 196. If professional care was apportioned
equally in the therapeutic and research settings, the interventions allowed under paragraph
two of § 2.14 could not stand-the research trials would invariably lead to the destruction of
the embryo.
12. Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and the "Old" Morality, 26 PUB. INTEREST
18, 18-32 (1972).
13. Id. at 32. Kass stated that the current boundaries for defining protectible human life
are "gerrymandered for the sake of abortion-namely, birth or viability-.., but they will not
survive the coming of more sophisticated technologies for making babies." Id. at 33-34.
14. Andrews & Hendriks, Legal and Moral Status of IVF/ET, in FOUNDATIONS OF IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION 334 (1987).
15. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUMAN EMBRYO LABORATORIES: STANDARDS
FAVORED TO ENSURE QUALITY (1989).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 10.
18. See, e.g., Fletcher, In Vitro Research Benefits May Outweigh Risks, Ethicist Says, 13
1991]
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physicians and researchers will become inured to the taking of human life.19
Assuming with IVF that the "genies have been let out of the bottle,"20 a
central concern is to ensure that artificial reproduction "remains our servant
and does not become our master."21 Maintaining control over IVF technol-
ogy cannot come solely through plans for self-regulation by the medical
community.22 Codes of medical conduct never contemplated a relationship
between the physician and the embryo existing ex utero, and current defini-
tions for a protectible legal interest offer no guidance to the medical commu-
nity.23 Rather, the traditional roles that have been applied in medical
relationships provide a more coherent pattern of values and ideological prin-
ciples to guide practitioners in assuming greater control of the IVF issue.
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that the medical commu-
nity currently does not have the capability to moderate the intense debate
surrounding the disposition of fertilized embryos existing ex utero. 24 This
Comment argues that current adventures by medical practitioners and re-
searchers into fertilized embryo technologies confuse the standard of care
practiced not only in the IVF context, but also in everyday doctor-patient
relationships. 25 IVF presents the prime example of how the boundaries be-
OB. GYN. NEWS 37 (Sept. 1978); Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Cryopreservation of
Human Embryos, 47 FERTILITY & STERILITY 371 (1987); Trounson, Preservation of Human
Eggs and Embryos, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1 (1986).
19. This thesis is supported if one believes that an embryo is a human life or represents a
potential for life. A myriad of factors, "including the demands of patients, scientists' yearning
for discovery, physicians' interest in satisfying patients' needs, lucrative possibilities, and pub-
lic fascination with technology," Bonnicksen, Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in the Clinical
Setting, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 26, 30 (Dec. 1988), all contribute to unjustified paternalis-
tic medical intervention. Doctors Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma decry this
"strong paternalism" because it "violates the architectonic aim of medicine, which is to heal
the one who is ill." E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE
RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 23 (1988).
20. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 665.
21. Id.
22. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and The Ameri-
can Fertility Society (AFS) have announced the establishment of a "national advisory board to
set guidelines and implement peer review procedures for activity in preembryo and fetal tissue
research." ACOG, News Release (Jan. 7, 1991). Interestingly, these organizations look to
self-regulation as a way to justify greater, rather than more limited, research.
23. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 666.
24. See, e.g., Fletcher, New Beginnings in Life, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE
OF MAN 78 (M. Hamilton ed. 1972); Kass, Babies By Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical
Experiments on the Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174 (1971); Ramsey, Shall We
"Reproduce"? The Medical Ethics of In Vitro Fertilization (pt.1), 220 J. A.M.A. 1346 (1972);
Gorney, Court Gives Woman Custody of 7 Embryo "Children ", Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1989, at
A13, col. 1 (citing to comments made by John Willke, President, National Right to Life).
25. IVF is contrary to the traditionally accepted view that medical practice contemplates
"interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or
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tween medical practice and research have become blurred.26 These two
functions must be kept separate in order to ensure the patient's well-being,
which is enhanced only when his or her interests are aligned with the doc-
tor's goal of care-giving.
27
If doctors are to continue to practice medicine within the parameters of
informed consent and thoroughgoing loyalty to the interests of their pa-
tients, 28 there must be "limits to the uninhibited pursuit of the fashiona-
ble."29 To this end, current standards of medical-professional responsibility
client and that have a reasonable expectation of success." THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE
BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 2 (1978) [hereinafter THE BELMONT REPORT]. On the one
hand, there is a decline in respect for life at its beginnings as enunciated by Dr. Giesen:
The prowess of medical science has always had its price, and, as far as artificial
reproduction is concerned, the price had been very high indeed. For every child born
of assisted conception, countless embryos have been destroyed in failed attempts at
cryopreservation or used up (and, thus, killed) in experimentation. The issues are
manifold and complex, but one thing is obvious: ethical, moral and legal obligations
are in conflict with some of the goals of research scientists, rendering restrictions
necessary.
D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 632 (footnotes omitted). At the other extreme, society may evolve
from passive maieutics to active euthanasia for the elderly based on subjective quality-of-life
judgments. Fletcher, The Moral Dimension in Clinical Decision Making, 50 PHAROS 2, 3
(1987).
26. Medical practice employs "existing knowledge to treat a patient, while research in-
volves the testing of hypotheses, which may reveal new knowledge." Gaze & Dawson, Who is
the Subject of the Research?, in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 2, at I11.
27. See Fletcher, supra note 25, at 2-4. This issue is considered in the context of a slip-
pery-slope; a loosening of respect at the core of relationships of trust leads to a general decline
in standards of conduct-applicable in this case to all interactions between doctor and patient.
See Lebacqz, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 40 LINACRE Q. 109, 114 (1973) (cau-
tioning against the use of selective abortion and criticizing the eugenic effect of "eliminating
deleterious genes from the gene pool").
28. In 1949 the World Medical Association drafted the International Code of Medical
Ethics. The section addressing a doctor's duties to the sick states:
A doctor must always bear in mind the obligation of preserving human life. A doc-
tor owes to the patient complete loyalty and all the resources of his science .... A
doctor shall preserve absolute secrecy on all he knows about his patients because of
the confidence entrusted in him.
D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 672.
29. Id. at 666 (footnote omitted). As of December 1990, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many criminalized all interventions not promoting the preservation of human embryos. The
law specifically provides for imprisonment if anyone "attempts to fertilize artificially an egg
cell for any purpose other than bringing about a pregnancy of the woman from whom the egg
cell originated." Law for Protection of Embryos § l(1)(ii), reprinted in 64 BULL. MED. ETH-
ICS 9 (Dec. 1990). The law also prohibits artificial fertilization after the death of a gamete
donor (§ 4), artificial alteration of human germ line cells (§ 5), cloning (§ 6), and the creation
of hybrid embryos containing "different genetic information from the embryo cells." (§ 7). Id.
at 10.
1991]
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cannot support unlimited research on extracorporeal embryos and should be
employed to curtail the creation of life in vitro. This analysis argues that
responsibility must be allocated in behalf of the laboratory embryo. Only in
this way will the respect accorded an extracorporeal embryo (incapable of
even presumptive consent) be equal to that accorded a mature, sentient pa-
tient (capable of giving informed consent to medical procedures).30 Medical
and legal responsibility in behalf of the embryo is supported if it is assumed
either that life begins at conception or that the embryo represents potential
life.31
Proceeding from the perspective of the doctor-patient relationship, this
Comment analyzes the need for limits on the use of IVF technology. Physi-
cians are faced with two concerns. First, the law does not provide an accept-
able guide for defining a physician's duty because the ex utero embryo does
not conform to the traditional conceptions of a life-in-being. This problem is
addressed from the perspectives of viability and autonomy. While the medi-
cal community has developed degrees of professional responsibility in both
contexts, those standards are inadequate when applied to the extracorporeal
embryo. Second, doctors who practice IVF necessarily find themselves con-
ducting unwarranted medical experimentation that is unsupported by in-
formed consent. This Comment concludes that IVF can continue within
limited bounds without harming the standard of care practiced in all doctor-
patient relationships.
II. DILEMMAS AT THE BEGINNING OF LIFE
The medical community currently lacks the capacity to make appropriate
30. Dr. Giesen asserts that in vitro fertilization, which involves "treating and transferring
embryos .... constitutes experimentation on human beings without the capacity to consent."
Giesen, Developing Ethical Public Policy on Reproduction and Prenatal Research: Whose Inter-
ests Deserve What Protection?, 8 MED. & L. 553, 553 (1989). Compare Silverman, Methodo-
logic Controversies in Clinical Research: Consent for Experimentation Involving Neonates, 296
AM. J. MED. SCI. 354 (1988). The disturbing tone of Silverman's research-oriented perspective
needs little elaboration: "From the perspective of 1988 in neonatal medicine, it is discouraging
to see that, despite the absence of objective information about social impact, the dogma of
informed consent in clinical trials has become deeply entrenched." Id. at 356.
31. It is the conflict represented by these two views that doctors must avoid. While differ-
ing views about the origins of life are strongly held, doctors should be careful to guard zeal-
ously the new professional respect that has been attained through patient self-awareness. The
progression from days of patient ignorance and a professional "guild" mentality "with no
critical ethical reflection," Fletcher, supra note 25, at 2, has been replaced by a new paradigm
of medicine where doctors and patients are partners in ending sickness. Any notion that the
doctor and his patient share a common enterprise is based on the concept of a patient's right to
self-determination, thereby minimizing the effect of medical paternalism. Veatch, Three Theo-
ries of Informed Consent: Philosophical Foundations and Policy Implications, in THE BELMONT
REPORT, supra note 25, at Appendix (Volume II, Chapter 26).
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decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos. This inability is due to
the failure of medical-ethical constructs to evolve with the development of
IVF and its frozen embryo technological counterpart.32 The problem is
compounded by the absence of legal principles that fail correspondingly to
offer guidance to the new technologies. Since the legal community has yet to
offer a comprehensive or systematic approach to these issues, an analysis of
current law must be applied analogically to the dilemma of a doctor's duty
to extracorporeal embryos.33 Any discussion of allocating the doctor's duty
must derive from an understanding of when that duty arises. The determin-
ing point, then, is that time when life begins. The following sections are
designed to explicate two views about the beginning of life. The first view is
discussed in terms of viability; the second view proceeds from the notion that
life begins at conception. Primary emphasis is placed on the dialogue be-
tween these views and the corresponding theories about the relationship be-
tween decisionmakers and the embryo existing ex utero. a4
In the first section, the United States Supreme Court's abortion decisions
offer a perspective of when life begins.3 5 The question of viability in this
32. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 649. Of particular importance to Giesen's call for limita-
tions on the use of IVF and cryopreservation is his acute awareness of what actually supports
our current enjoyment of IVF as an acceptable medical procedure. Giesen reports that 40%-
60% of embryos were destroyed just in the process of testing new techniques of cryopreserva-
tion. It is not ethically justifiable that many of these lost "ice-babies" were
created expressly for the purpose of testing the technique of deep-freezing. Cry-
opreservation, as a procedure, obviously involves room for human error, and thus
considerable risk for the embryos. It can therefore be justified only if immediate im-
plantation is impossible. The physician therefore has a duty not to fertilize more ova
than ought reasonably be implanted at one time.
Id. (footnote omitted).
33. John A. Robertson argues that the moral and legal status of extracorporeal pre-em-
bryos can be reconciled through an analysis of the intent to transfer or not to transfer these
entities for implantation in utero. There is merit to Robertson's general premise that some
duty arises, but there cannot be a "linking" between moral and legal principles as they exist
today. Therein lies the problem for medical professionals and those seeking legal reform.
Robertson, Extracorporeal Embryos and The Abortion Debate, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 53, 60-62 (1986). Robertson's theory and the thesis of this Comment, however, both
seek to harmonize moral principles whereby legal action actually serves these ends, instead of
the current state where the law finds itself unable to act in an area requiring immediate
attention.
34. While not technically correct, the embryo existing ex utero shall be referred to in the
shorthand of "embryo." Interestingly, the area of definitions is the source of significant con-
troversy between medical, legal, and moral authorities. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip
op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, rev'd, 1990 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 642, appeal granted sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 466.
35. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
1991]
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area, however, has been confused because of its relationship to the balancing
of a woman's liberty in her reproductive health and the state's interest in
protecting human life.36 Moreover, the viability test is inadequate; the anal-
ysis should be based on a relationship of respect for a potential life.37 In the
second section, an approach advocating full rights of personality for the em-
bryo is applied to a relationship based on reverence for an individual life.38
A. Viability Definitions
While the line of Supreme Court cases dealing with abortion appears to
enshrine the concept of viability as a static determiner of when life begins,
39
advances in medical science have weakened the viability concept, creating
uncertainty for doctors seeking to follow the Court's rulings.' If nothing
else, the Court's decisions have established a sliding scale whereby viability
is determined by the particular setting and the specific level of technology
available to the doctor.4 ' Many would apply the sliding scale approach to
379 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. The debate that followed this decision often proceeded from an
incorrect assumption of what the Supreme Court stated in the Roe opinion. The Court refused
to define when life begins, but instead sought to define the maturation of a protectible interest
in the pre-term fetus. Id. at 154-55.
37. Unfortunately, doctors who employ IVF and currently perform experiments on ex-
tracorporeal embryos borrow the viability standard from the abortion context, which was in-
tended to balance rights of survival between a mother and fetus. This application to research is
illogical because the potential life-in-being has the ability to be brought to term if provided
with a willing mother's uterus. The assertion by the ethics committee of the American Fertil-
ity Society, that the embryo used in IVF is a " 'preembryo' and should not be treated as a
person, because it has not yet developed ...and may never realize its potential," Ethical
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 84 (Supp.
1986), begs the viability issue because the embryo's situation ex utero (the absence of viability)
is a result of actions by the very parties who seek to benefit by a classification that does not
recognize a life interest.
38. This section will analyze the maximization of the principle of respect for autonomy in
medical practice and how the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence lead to unwar-
ranted paternalism by doctors involved in IVF. See generally T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHIL-
DRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1989) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS].
39. The Roe Court stated that "viability" occurred at that time when the fetus had "the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). However,
there is no definition for "meaningful life" in the opinion.
40. Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and
Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 629 (1986) [hereinafter Special Project]. Modern perinatal care
continues to increase the time that the fetus can survive outside the mother. Id. "Perinatal"
defines that period between the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy and the first seven days after
birth. Id. (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1055 (24th ed. 1982)).
41. H.T. ENGELHART, MEDICINE AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON, CONCEPTS OF PER-
SONHOOD 94-101 (1976). Engelhart correctly proposes that there is an "arbitrary line" drawn
between what we identify as a fetus and an infant. He says: "We recognize ... that some
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the current debate regarding frozen embryos if only because medical tech-
nology is unable to simulate the delicate placental tissue necessary for fetal
respiration.42 Although the analytical framework established in Roe v.
Wade43 permits state intrusion in the context of "protecting the health of the
pregnant woman" and the "potentiality of human life"' in utero, the crea-
tion of life--ex utero-falls outside these two parameters because Roe only
addressed the potentiality of human life within the scope of a woman's re-
productive autonomy.
Roe v. Wade was the Supreme Court's first attempt to define a protectible
human interest. 45 Although the decision was reached from a perspective of
protecting the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy within the
bounds of a general privacy interest,46 the Court recognized the role of a
physician as a guardian of the state's compelling interest in fetal life at the
beginning of the third trimester.47 While the Court held that abortions
could be procured with little or no state intervention during the first trimes-
ter,48 it rejected a proposition that privacy rights were absolute and entitled
a woman to choose an abortion at any time.49
By placing the role of the doctor-as guardian-at the center of the post-
trimster abortion controversy, the Roe Court ran counter to traditional
rules established by the medical profession for the protection of patients.5°
The Court focused on the following part of the Hippocratic Oath which
states, "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I
make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an
abortive remedy."'" Unaware of a perceived history in the medical commu-
human biological life is treated as human personal life even though it does not involve the
existence of a person in the strict sense." Id. at 99.
42. Special Project, supra note 40, at 630.
43. 410 U.S. 113, 149-50 (1973).
44. Id. at 162.
45. Dr. Leon R. Kass envisioned that embryos, created ex utero, would redefine the issue
of protectible humanity because "nascent lives [were] being deliberately created despite certain
knowledge that many of them [would] be destroyed or discarded." Kass, New Beginnings in
Life, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 34 (M. Hamilton ed. 1972).
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
47. Id. at 163.
48. Id. at 166.
49. Id. at 155.
50. See id. at 130-32 (summarizing ancient critiques of the Hippocratic tradition in pro-
posing that anti-abortion policies did not become part of the medical standard of conduct until
the nineteenth century).
51. Id. (interpreting A. CASTIGLIONI, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 84 (1947)). The Hippo-
cratic Oath places two duties upon doctors-nonmaleficence and beneficence. BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 38, at 120 ("I will use treatment to help the sick according to my
ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them."). The principle of
nonmaleficence states that "one ought not to inflict evil or harm," while the principle of benefi-
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nity of strenuous opposition to abortion,52 the Court gave consideration to
mainstream representatives of the profession who recognized a modem trend
within the American Medical Association (AMA) sanctioning abortion
within the context of regulated and accepted medical procedures.53
By recognizing this modem trend, the Court, in effect, supported the med-
ical community's attempt at self-regulation by acknowledging the value of
"informed patient consent" and "sound clinical judgment" about the deci-
sion to perform an abortion.54 Yet, even in sanctioning abortion, the Court
acknowledged that the right could be qualified," recognizing that a doctor
could exert some influence over a woman's choice for abortion during the
first trimester-presumably where the woman's right is paramount.56 The
putative concerns of maintaining professional standards, however, were in
conflict with the very definition of life imposed by the Court; the holding of
Roe v. Wade has determined how doctors and researchers approach life
issues.
As a result of the Court's attempt to define a protectible interest in life, a
doctor is entitled to protect the unborn only when the fetus is "potentially
cence requires that one "prevent" or "remove evil or harm," Id. at 122-23. The World Medi-
cal Association has adopted this modem interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath:
I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of humanity. I will
give to my teachers the respect and gratitude which is their due. I will practise my
profession with conscience and dignity. The health of my patients will be my first
consideration. I will respect the secrets which are confined in me. I will maintain by
all the means in my power the honour and the noble traditions of the medical profes-
sion. My colleagues will be my brothers. I will not permit considerations of reli-
gions, nationality, race, party politics or social standing to intervene between my
duty and my patient. I will maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the
time of conception; even under threat, I will not use my medical knowledge contrary
to the laws of humanity. I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my
honour.
D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 671.
52. More emphasis should have been given to those members of the medical community
who conscientiously allowed abortion therapy out of a concern for the best interest of their
patients.
53. Roe, 410 U.S. at 143 (citing proceedings from the AMA House of Delegates (June
1970)).
54. Id.
55. The Roe Court specifically recognized the context of the woman's relationship to state
regulation: "[A] State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in main-
taining medical standards, and in protecting potential life." Id. at 154.
56. Id. at 143-44. The Court looked to that part of a June 25, 1970, American Medical
Association resolution which stated that an abortion, "like any other medical procedure,
should not be performed when contrary to the best interests of the patient since good medical
practice requires due consideration for the patient's welfare and not mere acquiescence to the
patient's demand." Id.
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able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."57 The
Court fashioned a superior right of a woman to control her reproductive
health prior to the viability of the fetus. In this respect, however, the sliding
scale does not provide an authentic balance if the two competing parties do,
in fact, assert equally recognized values in personal autonomy.5 8 Nonethe-
less, the Court's post-Roe decisions confirm the sliding scale approach. The
matrix of Roe v. Wade thus imposes two standards of care on the physi-
cian--one for the pregnant woman and one for the unborn fetus. 59
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth," the Court struck down a Missouri
abortion statute requiring a doctor to preserve the life and health of the fetus
at any stage of pregnancy.61 In that instance, the Court recognized the duty
owed by. the doctor to the fetus only after the point of viability.62 Although
not directly addressed in Danforth, of central importance to the issue of fro-
zen embryos was the Court's recognition that the standard of viability is a
"medical term." Justice Blackmun's majority opinion framed the policy
concerns as follows:
[I]t is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to
place viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific
point in the gestation period. The time when viability is achieved
may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a
particular fetus is viable is ... a matter for the judgment of the
responsible attending physician.63
The Danforth majority also modified its definition of viability by upholding a
provision of the state law defining viability as the ability to survive outside
the mother for an "indefinite" period of time.'
57. Id. at 160; see also Special Project, supra note 40, at 630 (discussing advancements in
neonatal care).
58. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 645. Dr. Giesen suggests that the United States example
of a right to abortion would not survive constitutional challenge under the German constitu-
tion of 1949, which protects life at its earliest stages. Id. at 645 n.79. In Germany, the right to
life of the fetus is recognized without regard to the considerations of viability that trigger the
maturation of a compelling state interest within the American framework.
59. It is here that the analysis takes on a more analogic tone because there are few cases
on point that discuss the viability issue in the context of the embryo existing ex utero.
60. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
61. Id. at 83.
62. Id. Contrary to the Supreme Court's later assertion in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services that Roe v. Wade should be limited in the future to a perceived liberality in the
ability for a woman to obtain an abortion, another Missouri statute declaring that the "life of
each human being begins at conception," and that "unborn children have protectable interests
in life, health, and well-being," Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1), 1.205.1(2) (1986), was effec-
tively nullified by the Webster Court's affirmance of the viability approach. 109 S. Ct. 3040,
3058 (1989).
63. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64.
64. Id. at 63. The Missouri abortion statute also provided that, while no specific time
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The impact of the sliding scale in defining the beginning of life was
demonstrated again in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health.6 5 In deciding that a comprehensive state regulatory plan was over-
broad and had the effect of chilling access to an abortion,66 the Court
stressed the importance of the physician in consulting with the woman seek-
ing an abortion.6 7 This holding was strengthened by the Court's rejection of
the state's requirement that the doctor inform his patient that life begins at
conception and that an abortion is a "major surgical procedure" with serious
physical and emotional consequences.6" A similar state statute was rejected
by the Court in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists,"9 where the Pennsylvania legislature attempted to dictate the physi-
cian's role by insisting that he or she provide specific information to a
woman seeking an abortion.7 ° Perhaps the most objectionable provision of
the statute was the delineation of specific criteria necessary to relieve the
physician from liability for failure to inform his patient of the attendant risks
of the abortion procedure.7 1 The Thornburgh Court was unwilling to allow
the consultation role of the physician, spoken of in Danforth and Akron and
defined by the parameters of a relationship based on informed consent, 72 to
be transmuted into a vehicle for promoting a specific state policy.
73
limit would be used to determine viability, an infant who survived "an attempted abortion...
not performed to save the life or health of the mother" became a ward of the state. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.040 (Vernon 1976). By not defining a specific time limit, the statute exemplified
the sliding scale.
65. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
66. Id. at 434.
67. Id. at 447. The Court stressed "the central role of the physician, both in consulting
with the woman about whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abor-
tion was to be carried out." Id. (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979)).
68. Id. at 444-45.
69. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
70. Section 3205 of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act required that the woman give
her "informed consent" to the procedure. Yet, the Court found that the chilling effect of the
statute was similar to that found in Akron. Id. at 760.
71. Rather than contributing to the woman's informed consent, the Court found that the
criteria required by the state were designed to "influence" her choices. Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
at 760. Several criteria are plainly violative of the privacy concerns at the core of informed
consent--e.g, requiring that certain print material be provided for patient review containing
information on (i) the possible alternatives to abortion, (ii) the availability of private agencies
willing to help the woman carry her child to term, and (iii) the "probable anatomical and
physiological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments from fer-
tilization to full term, including any relevant information on the possibility of the unborn
child's survival." Id. at 761.
72. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
8 (1986) (informed consent contributes to autonomous decionmaking).
73. For views critical of physician participation in the context of "therapeutic abortion"
in the United Kingdom, see generally Grubb, Abortion Law in England: The Medicalization of
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A more restrictive statutory scheme was previously rejected in Colautti v.
Franklin.74 The Court found that autonomous decisionmaking by a woman
was absolute prior to viability of the fetus.75 Section 5(a) of the Penn-
sylvania Abortion Control Act imposed criminal liability upon the doctor
for failing to safeguard the life of the pre-term fetus upon a finding of viabil-
ity or a "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable.",7 6 As in
Akron," the Pennsylvania statute's imposition of a new standard of care
confused the doctor's duty of loyalty.7" The Court wisely found the statute
void for vagueness because it was uncertain whether it allowed the doctor
"to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount to his duty to the fetus
or whether it require[d] the physician to make a trade-off between the wo-
man's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival."7 9
The state requirements struck down in Colautti, Akron, and Thornburgh
violated traditional notions of informed consent because the subject of the
doctor-patient relationship lost the ability to make an "autonomous authori-
zation" for particular medical treatment, free of legislative bias conveyed
through the physician.8" Like the state requirements, the unrestricted use of
IVF and its attendant technologies further erodes the already fragile as-
sumptions that are the basis of informed consent because the extracorporeal
embryo does not possess the ability for self-determination."
It is more convenient for those who advocate that the use of IVF is accept-
able for medical experimentation if the embryo is deemed not to possess
rights of personality.8 2 The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on abor-
a Crime, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 146 (1990); Mackay, The Relationship Between
Abortion and Child Destruction in English Law, 7 MED. & L. 177 (1988).
74. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
75. Id. at 386. While there is no "absolute constitutional right to abortion on ... de-
mand," id. at 387 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973)), the Court significantly
reduced any contemplated restrictions on a doctor's medical judgment when determining via-
bility. Id. at 388-90.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977).
77. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
78. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 397-98, 400.
79. Id. at 400. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior thereto have made a
determination based on his experience, judgment or professional competence that the
fetus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is viable ... shall exercise
that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of
the fetus ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a).
80. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 38, at 76.
81. Informed consent is designed to protect the value of self-determination and to advance
benefits that accrue to the patient from therapeutic medical practice. See generally Riskin,
Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 20 U. ILL. L.F. 580 (1975).
82. See generally Grobstein, The Moral Uses of "Spare" Embryos, 12 HASTINGS CENTER
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tion, however, may call into question such a facile determination of protect-
able life. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services83 has left open the
possibility for more restrictive state regulation of abortion by upholding a
Missouri statute premised on the belief that "[tihe life of each human being
begins at conception" and that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests
in life, health, and well-being." 4 While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Webster held that policy statements regarding when life begins could not
be used to "justify" an otherwise unconstitutional regulation of abortion,8 5 a
plurality of the Supreme Court would not rule on whether the provision
created rights in the unborn under other state laws.8 6 By this evolution of
abortion law, extracorporeal embryos could be accorded a different status
than their in utero counterparts, particularly because IVF does not present
the "two-lives-in-one body conflict.""s Such a result is legally sustainable
because the viability approach has only been applied to fetal life existing in
utero.88 Thus, in an post-Webster environment, when questions about the
beginning of life are presented in a non-abortion setting, extracorporeal em-
REP. 5 (June 1982); Jones, The Ethics of In Vitro Fertilization-] 982, 37 FERTILITY & STERIL-
ITY 146 (1982). Physicians should be circumspect of those who advocate that an embryo lacks
the characteristics of personhood and, therefore, is not entitled to protection. See generally
Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood." A Tentative Profile of Man, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 1,
1-2 (Nov. 1972) (listing, inter alia, the following criteria to define "humanness:" minimal intel-
ligence, self-awareness, self-control, sense of time, sense of futurity, sense of the past, capability
to relate to others, and control of existence).
83. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
84. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 1990). "The Act further requires
that all Missouri laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with the same rights enjoyed
by other persons ...." Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3047.
85. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3049-50 (criticizing and quoting Reproductive Health Services
v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (8th Cir. 1988), in turn quoting Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (dictum) (citation omitted)).
86. Id. at 3050 ("The Court has emphasized that Roe v. Wade 'implies no limitation on
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.' Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 [(1977)].").
87. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 646.
With IVF there is never any doubt as to whether fertilization has taken place, but at
present the embryo must be implanted in utero in order to develop past the early
stages of cleavage. Some scholars make use of this fact to argue that the embryo
should enjoy protection only after implantation; others feel that the life of the em-
bryo deserves respect only after a certain stage of maturity (e.g. after sentience has
set in). However, in law, there is no room for differentiation between human life and
human life. The human embryo enjoys legal protection from the moment it comes
into existence.
Id. at 647 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
88. Annas, Webster and the Politics of Abortion, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 36 (Mar./
Apr. 1989). Annas states that the trimester approach for abortion is "a technologically based
decision, relying as it does on the safety of medical techniques to ascertain the stage of preg-
nancy when abortion is safer than carrying the fetus to term, and a determination of 'viability'
Dangerous Relations
bryos could receive a status different than that of their in utero counterparts,
and, consequently, a physician's duty of care to IVF embryos may be greater
than previously thought.
As seen above, the standard of viability established by the Supreme Court
creates a medical obligation for the physician to the woman seeking an abor-
tion, thus weakening state efforts to intrude upon the privacy relationship
between doctor and patient. This relationship, defined by the respect for
patient autonomy, is discussed again in the following section. However, the
Court's treatment of viability does not offer a guide for physician standards
of conduct toward the embryo because advances in technology are now mak-
ing these traditional legal determinations of viability more difficult.8 9 It ap-
pears that Leon Kass' prediction regarding the confusion of definitions of life
has been realized in the debate generated by the issues of abortion and in
vitro fertilization. 90
B. The Case For Autonomy Of The In Vitro Subject
The Second Vatican Council stated in its pastoral constitution, Gaudium
et Spes,91 that God's absolute commandment to "love thy neighbor as thy-
self" makes clear His plan that humankind be mindful of preserving the
communitarian nature of life.92 This general plan applies to all lives in being
and supports the Church's official teaching that the destruction of an em-
bryo, no matter how undifferentiated in development, is murder.93 How-
ever, the application of these morally consistent principles engenders great
confusion when a physician is faced with the option of creating in vitro em-
bryos for the purpose of implantation and eventual birth. The Church's
moral imperative, when applied to the United States experience of medical
ethics and physician duty, yields to a duality associated with the rights of
autonomy (in this case, those of the embryo) and a community interest in
fostering a general attitude of respect for life.
94
by physicians and scientists for choosing this as a constitutionally relevant boundary." Id. at
38. However, these terms provide little protection to the extracorporeal embryo.
89. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Kass, supra note 12, at 33.
91. THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 11 183-317 (1966).
92. Id. at 223-24.
93. Donovan, Test Tube Killing, 45 HOMILETIC & PASTORAL REV. 59, 60 (1944) (section
entitled Answers to Questions).
94. There is an important distinction to make when discussing "autonomy." The concept
is often confused with an unlimited notion of "sovereignty" that is counter to the necessity of
balancing individual liberties with the domain of those decisions that primarily and directly
offset only the interests of the decisionmaker. Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy:
Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 446-64 (1983). If autonomy
1991]
322 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 7:307
Justice O'Connor recognized a definition of viability which could ulti-
mately require respect for both autonomy and for human life to ensure pres-
ervation of the extracorporeal embryo. In her Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health dissent she wrote:
As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate
existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back
toward conception. Moreover, it is clear that the trimester ap-
proach violates the fundamental aspiration of judicial decisionmak-
ing through the application of neutral principles ....
The application of a blanket assumption that life begins at conception dem-
onstrates how inadequately current medical-ethical constructs can accom-
modate IVF because a life in being must be allowed the opportunity for
complete development, regardless of any custodial or contractual obligations
surrounding ferilization.9 6 Doctors implicate themselves in a maze of issues
concerning their responsibility when embryos are regarded as individuals
who possess legal rights.9 7 A recent case demonstrates how the application
of this assumption will limit those in the medical community who demand
more access to IVF technology.98
1. Davis v. Davis." Life Begins at Conception?
In late September of 1989, the Circuit Court for Blount County, Tennes-
see (Equity Division) heard the case of Davis v. Davis.99 This case presented
a claim for child custody by a woman who had participated with her hus-
band in the in vitro fertilization procedure. "° The couple hoped that the
process of in vitro fertilization would enable them to produce children who
is violated by a nonconsensual touching, then it is also violated by the withholding of physical
treatment requested by the subject. Id. at 453.
95. Akron, 462 U.S. at 458. See generally Mangel, Legal Abortion: The Impending Obso-
lescence of the Trimester Framework, 14 AM. J. L. & MED. 69 (1988).
96. See Charlesworth, Community Control of IVF and Embryo Experimentation, in EM-
BRYO EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 2, at 151 (cautioning that an IVF embryo is, because of
its "exposed" position, subject to a greater array of human interventions than its in vivo
counterpart).
97. Responsibility is created toward a life in being once it is recognized as such. On a
reciprocal level, though, the in vitro subject is limited to a "discretionary competence" in
theory because it has no ability to speak for itself. Feinberg, supra note 94, at 454.
98. One doctor who was very active in research on human embryos responded truculently
to the Health and Human Services ban on federally-funded projects: "It's irrational. It slows
the progress of science. It's very frustrating to me that I cannot get NIH [National Institutes
of Health] funds." Ubell, supra note 10, at 15.
99. No. E-14496, slip op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641,
rev'd, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, appeal granted sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 1990 Tenn.
LEXIS 466.
100. Davis, slip op. at 4-6, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *4-9.
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shared a genetic bond with them.1 Before a successful implantation could
be achieved, however, the couple was divorced, leaving seven embryos cry-
ogenically preserved in the office of a local physician specializing in fertility
therapy. 102 The claim for custody of the seven embryos was initiated by
Mrs. Davis, who still desired to bear children.
In granting Mrs. Davis' petition for custody, the court held that the seven
embryos were children and ordered their disposition in the following
manner:
[T]he Court finds and concludes that it is to the manifest best inter-
est of the children, in vitro, that they be made available for implan-
tation to assure their opportunity for live birth; implantation is
their sole and only hope for survival. The Court respectfully finds
and concludes that it further serves the best interest of these chil-
dren for Mrs. Davis to be permitted the opportunity to bring these
children to term through implantation.
10 3
The ruling was made over the strenuous objection of Mr. Davis. He con-
tended that the seven embryos were joint property and that the order al-
lowing for the possibility of implantation by his former wife violated his
desire not to become a father."° Testimony was given by a variety of ex-
perts in the field of embryology to the effect that few could agree on a defini-
tion for the beginning of life. ' The judge, however, did find support for his
decision by interpreting other statutes in his jurisdiction that involved life
issues. He concluded that the State of Tennessee did not intend for its
wrongful death or criminal abortion statutes to "declar[e] the rights to be
accorded a human embryo, in vitro, in a divorce case."' 6 The court further
found that the common law doctrine of parens patriae would be used to
determine the best interests of the children.0 7
101. Id. at 6, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *9.
102. Id. at 5, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *7-8.
103. Id. at 20, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *37. For a scathing critique of the ruling in
Davis, see Annas, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20
(Nov./Dec. 1989).
104. Davis, slip op. at B3, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *59. John Robertson proposed that
Mrs. Davis' "interest in reproduction can be satisfied by having her undergo yet another IVF
cycle with a new partner or donor." Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 19
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7, 9 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
105. Davis, slip op. at 114-19, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *61-72. Of the four experts who
presented testimony at trial, three believed that the human embryos were at a stage in develop-
ment "where they simply possess the potential for life." Id. at 8, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at
* 13. In response, the court made issue of the fact that the term "pre-embryo" had been used
by practitioners of IVF as a way around the issue of viability. Id. at 11-12, 1989 Tenn. App.
LEXIS at *20-21.
106. Id. at 17, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *31.
107. Id. at 19, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *35. Circuit Judge W. Dale Young cited In re
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Although Davis was overturned on appeal,1 o8 there are some incongruities
raised by the trial court's decision that appear in similar cases in the United
States. o9 First, by declaring that the Davis embryos were created only for
the production of the couple's children, the judge contradicted his earlier
holding that human embryos are not property. "0 To be consistent, one
would have to side with the position awarding the embryos near perfect
rights of autonomy. The Davis ruling, by giving custody of the embryos to
the mother, presumably incapable of carrying all embryos to term, merely
reverts to a lower standard of respect, treating the "children" as imperiled
newborns."'
Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), for the general principles of the parens
patriae power. However, Judge Young's bald assertion that "[t]he thrust of the equitable na-
ture of this doctrine is that it turns its full focus on the best interests of the child," without
concern "for those who claim rights of the child," appears more concerned with proving that
he actually had dispositional authority over this case from the "Court's having historic Chan-
cery or equity jurisdiction." Davis, slip op. at 19, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *35. The key
theoretical difference is that the parens patriae power was used in the Baby M case to terminate
parental rights. In Re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 399, 525 A.2d at 1171. The Davis case
effectively imposed the "irreversible burdens" of fatherhood on the husband. Robertson, supra
note 104, at 9. Another method of determining the "best interests" of the embryos would be to
treat them "as though they were fully developed children and subject to the appointment of a
guardian ad litem by a court." Smith, Australia's Frozen "Orphan "Embryos: A Medical, Legal
and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27, 31 (1985-86). Interestingly, this argument, proceed-
ing from a court of equity's jurisdiction, also supports the imposition of a constructive trust
upon the Davis' fertility doctor. The court could then "prevent acts inconsistent with the
perceived intention of the parties in question from occurring." Id.
108. Davis v. Davis, C/A No. 180, slip op. (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), 1990 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 642, appeal granted sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 466. Noting
that Mary Davis no longer wished to implant the embryos, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
noted that "it would be repugnant and offensive to constitutional principles to order Mary Sue
to implant these fertilized ova against her will" as well as "order Junior [Mr. Davis] to bear the
psychological, if not the legal, consequences of paternity against his will." Id. at 6, 1990 Tenn.
App. LEXIS at *8-9. The reversal was premised on the protectibn of Mr. Davis' right "not to
beget a child where no pregnancy had taken place." Id. at 4, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *6.
109. Two unreported cases with facts similar to those Davis have been filed in Louisville,
Tennessee and Cleveland, Ohio. See Boskey, The Law of Alternative Reproductive Technolo-
gies, in 4 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE 64-A-28 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990).
110. Davis, slip op. at 2, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *2.
111. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 38, at 73. Beauchamp and Childress argue
that the principle of respect for autonomy only applies to those individuals who have the
ability to assert personal claims. Id.; see Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... ") (Cardozo, J.), overruled
on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 665, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1957). For an analysis
of the legal, medical, and ethical issues concerning nontreatment decisions for critically ill
newborns, see generally Imperiled Newborns, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (Dec. 1987). The
designation "lower standard of respect" is used in this instance because treatment decisions for
critically ill newborns are made often on shifting perceptions of the child's quality-of-life po-
tential. See Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 407
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Consistency with the judge's ruling demands that all seven of the remain-
ing embryos be implanted in the mother. Failure to act by the fertilization
specialist, who currently has the seven frozen embryos stored in a freezer in
his office," 2 could lead to varying forms of liability." 3 While these exam-
ples are only hypothetical, they do demonstrate that once a duty of care is
established, it cannot be ignored because of the particular state of life cur-
rently possessed by a moral subject." 4 On the face of the trial court's opin-
ion in Davis, it could be assumed that the wife attained a victory in defeating
the husband's petition for the seven embryos not to be implanted (or, effec-
tively, allowed to die). "5 However, the mother's maintenance of the em-
bryos in frozen storage could be considered an "injurious environment" for
the children and tantamount to neglect by failing to meet a minimum stan-
dard of necessary support." 6
(1982). However, the ex utero embryo has the potential to develop completely, provided it is
transferred to a gestational environment. See Baylis, The Ethics of Ex Utero Research on Spare
"Non- Viable"IVF Human Embryos, 4 BIOETHICS 311, 314, 317 (1990).
112. Davis, slip op. at 5, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *7.
113. Liability may proceed by way of actions for breach of contract or infliction of emo-
tional distress. See Boskey, supra note 109, at 64-A-30. To date it is unclear whether Louisi-
ana, the only state recognizing the ex utero embryo as a human being, would support a murder
charge against a physician, who by act or omission, caused the "death" of a fertilized embryo.
See Kasimba, IVF Regulation: The Search for a Legal Basis, in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION,
supra note 2, at 163.
114. This is the most persuasive use for a deontological theory of responsibility in the medi-
cal profession and supports a dramatic curtailment in the current use of IVF. In this para-
digm, the categorical imperative would be the preservation of all life, regardless of the
condition of the recipient of that care. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 38, at 40.
115. However, Mary Davis' position was tenuous in response to her husband's appeal. She
had since remarried and no longer desired to use the embryos; she preferred that they be
donated to other childless couples. The argument in her appellate brief hardly seems credible:
Appellee requests that this case be viewed solely for what it is; a case of a woman
who tried desperately for years to become a mother and, upon embarking upon what
may be her last chance, has been thwarted by the cruel decision of a husband who
changed his mind in midstream.
Brief for Appellee at 10, Davis v. Davis, (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), 1990 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 642 (C/A No. 180).
The appeal of Junior Davis was more consonant with the issue addressed by the Court of
Appeals:
Judge Young's decision to give Mary Sue the exclusive control over the use of the
embryos weakly promotes his anthropomorphic view that they are "children." His
notion that these fertilized, frozen ovum [sic] irreversibly fulfilled the Davis' inten-
tion to become parents is alien to the well-settled laws which permit continuing
choice until at least the end of the first trimester.
Brief for Appellant at 20, Davis v. Davis, (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), 1990 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 642 (C/A No. 180).
116. H.D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 285 (1971) (showing that
parental neglect depends on a finding of fault). Pending the initial decision of Davis v. Davis, a
Tennessee attorney petitioned the Circuit Court for Blount County, Tennessee to appoint a
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2. York v. Jones: Embryos as Property
In contrast to Davis v. Davis, a federal court in Virginia held that ex-
tracorporeal embryos were property within the parameters of a bailor-bailee
relationship.' 17 At issue was the conduct of a large and well-established fer-
tility clinic in Norfolk, Virginia.118 The plaintiffs, Risa and Steven York,
were a married couple who had engaged the services of the Jones Institute of
Reproductive Medicine, seeking to have "their own genetic child."' 19 Over
a two-year period, Mrs. York attempted to become implanted with previ-
ously fertilized embryos on four occasions. When these efforts failed, the
couple sought to have their remaining cryogenically preserved embryo trans-
ferred to another fertility clinic. The controversy arose when the Jones
Clinic refused to surrender the remaining embryo.
120
Claiming that the Virginia Human Research Statute limited the York's
dispositional authority over the embryo, the Jones Clinic defended its refusal
to act on the grounds that a signed consent form implicitly incorporated the
protocols of the state human research committee.1 21 The relevant provision
of the Cryopreservation Agreement provided for "three fates" for any "pre-
zygotes remaining in frozen storage." These options were limited to dona-
tion to an anonymous infertile couple, donation for approved research, or
removal from cold storage "but not allowed to undergo further develop-
ment." 122 However, the court held that the Yorks had a proprietary interest
in the frozen embryo that could not be vitiated by the apparently restrictive
provisions of the contract.
123
In ruling in favor of the Yorks, the court approved two theories relevant
to the character of the embryo. First, the contract created a bailor-bailee
guardian or temporary custodial parent for the seven Davis embryos. The petition specifically
stated that "time [was] of the essence" because the survival rate of in vitro embryos declined
with the passage of time and that Mrs. Davis' actions constituted "constructive abandonment"
of the embryos. Petition to Appoint a Guardian/Alternate Temporary Custodial Parent and/
or for Change of Temporary Custody, by R.D. Hash, Esq. at 3-4, Davis v. Davis (Tenn. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (No. E-14496).
117. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 427 (E.D. Va. 1989). While a bailment may be
defined "as the rightful possession of goods by one who is not the owner," S. WILLISTON, LAW
OF CONTRACTS 875 (1967), the bailee, nevertheless, "is under a duty to exercise a certain
degree of care over the bailed chattel, and to return it to the bailor on demand." R. BROWN,
THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 209 (1975).
118. York, 717 F. Supp. at 423.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 424.
121. Id. at 425.
122. Id. at 424-25. In Davis v. Davis, the third option was requested by Mr. Davis during
the divorce proceeding that granted custody of seven frozen embryos to Mrs. Davis.
123. York, 717 F. Supp. at 427.
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relationship because Virginia law did not require a finding of specific intent
by both parties to do so. 124 Because the relationship between the parties had
been terminated by the Yorks, the Jones Clinic, as bailee, had an "absolute
obligation to return the subject matter of the bailment to the bailor."' 25 The
court also concluded that an action in detinue would support the plaintiff's
recovery.' 26 In dicta, the court noted that the state human research statute
did not apply to this contract dispute because the statute's purpose was to
ensure that informed consent is obtained in order to "protect both scientist
and subject from the legal claims of the other."'127 Viewing informed con-
sent as a type of contractual relationship itself, the interests of the embryo in
York seem conspicuously unrepresented.
While the fortunate reality of York v. Jones (in contradistinction to Davis
v. Davis) was the presence of two parents who both desired to nurture a
child,' 21 the conflict with the fertility clinic demonstrates the difficulty of
aligning duties between responsible parties. Clearly, Dr. Jones' goals were
not always parallel to those of the Yorks because he sought to retain control
of the embryo. The Yorks believed that their child was being held "hos-
tage," 121 while Dr. Jones viewed the embryo as part of a procedure that
might have resulted in a successful pregnancy.'
30
3. Synthesis of Concepts To Redefine Physician Loyalty
Fueled by commercial interests, practitioners and researchers, engaged in
the "business of initiating new life," '' 3  will continue to argue for a relaxa-
tion of restrictions on the use of IVF until both the medical and legal com-
munities undertake a systematic and informed resolution about the basic
question of when life begins. It is because the subject of this controversy
124. Id. at 425 ("Rather, all that is needed 'is the element of lawful possession however
created, and duty to account for the thing as the property of another that creates the bailment
.... .(citation and quotation omitted)).
125. Id. (citing Annotation, Bailments, 8 AM. JUR. 2D § 178 (1980)).
126. Id. at 427. The court stated the five elements of a detinue action in Virginia:
(1) plaintiff must have a property interest in the thing sought to be recovered; (2) the
right to immediate possession; (3) the property is capable of identification; (4) the
property must be of some value; and (5) defendant must have had possession at some
time prior to the institution of the act.
Id. (citing D.T. Vicars v. Atlantic Discount Co., 205 Va. 934, 938, 140 S.E.2d 667, 670
(1965)). The very foundations of this theory of chattel recovery would also lend support to the
theory of imposing a constructive trust upon the clinic.
127. York, 717 F. Supp. at 426.
128. The ethical sense of what is meant "to have a child of one's own" is usually limited to
the parents. Kass, "Making Babies" Revisited, 54 Pun. INTEREST 32, 44 (1979).
129. Seligman, Tempest in a Test Tube, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1989, at 66-67.
130. Jones, supra note 82, at 147.
131. Kass, supra note 45, at 30.
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exists outside the current parameters of understanding protectible life that
two very opposite cases like Davis v. Davis and York v. Jones can be decided
at virtually the same time. This current scarcity of legal principles wrong-
fully permits the physician to practice IVF with little guidance.
131
In testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Science
and Technology, the attorney who represented Risa and Steven York capa-
bly summarized the lack of legal guidance with these words:
The medical technologies of... embryo freezing and the donation
of sperm, ova and embryos are being forced into the Procrustean
bed of existing laws on paternity, fetal research and adoption. The
result is an insufficient protection of the participants in the new
conceptions, including the children.
133
This testimony correctly assigns primary concern to a doctor's duty towards
the extracorporeal embryo by focusing on maintaining general standards of
informed consent. If a physician is unsure whether he or she has laid a
proper foundation for obtaining the informed consent of a patient, 134 society
should limit IVF and live embryo research because it is dangerous to apply
the fiction of "surrogate consent" to the same authority that has disposi-
tional control over the extracorporeal embryo. 135 Indeed, the legal and med-
ical communities must fashion concrete standards governing the relationship
between the doctor and extracorporeal embryo. Current standards are inad-
equate to the task, although some legislative protections could be interpreted
to impose negative duties upon responsible parties by prohibiting specific
dispositional acts relating to previable life. 136 An ancillary provision of the
132. See Bonnicksen & Blank, The Government and In Vitro Fertilization (IVF): Views of
IVF Directors, 49 FERTILITY & STERILITY 396 (1988). Based on a survey of IVF practition-
ers, there was a consensus that government involvement would only "restrict progress." Id.
133. Human Embryo Transfer: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1984). For
further discussion, see Andrews & Hendricks, Legal and Moral Status ofIVF/ET, in FOUN-
DATIONS OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (C. Fredericks, J. Paulson & A. DeCherney eds. 1987).
134. Brody, Transparency: Informed Consent in Primary Care, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
5, 6 (Sept./Oct. 1989).
135. See J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 99 n.18
(1982) [hereinafter CHILDRESS].
Because consent is so important an implication of the principle of respect for persons,
we resort to fictions such as presumed consent .... Yet we should resort to fictions
... only with the greatest care and caution, for under the guise of "consent" they
may imply a more extensive paternalism than is warranted.
Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
136. Eight states prohibit the sale of fetal tissue: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-802 (1987);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188-036 (Vernon Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.015 (1985); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West
1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(b) (Purdon 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208
(1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02 (Vernon 1989). Seven states prohibit the sale of live
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Uniform Anatomical Gift Act also could protect embryos, but to have such
a provision would first require that the embryo not have any rights under the
law as an individual.' 37 Either approach would be preferable to the current
want of legal guidance.
138
Several factors demonstrate that a relationship based on respect for the
autonomous person cannot exist between doctor and embryo. First, there is
no foundation for obtaining consent. While it is beneficial to follow a rule
that non-autonomous individuals or entities do not lose all expectations of
privacy, 139 there is a different standard of conduct applicable to the nonau-
tonomous subject. Second, the embryo is often treated as a means toward
some other goal, rather than as an end in itself.1" Third, there is an inevita-
fetuses: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West Supp. 1990); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9:122 (West
Supp. 1990); ME, REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(2690)
(Callaghan 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(f)
(Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1988).
137. Section 4307 of the New York State Code, Prohibition of Sales and Purchases of
Human Organs, follows the language of the Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer for valuable consideration any human organ for use in human transplanta-
tion. The term human organ means the human kidney, liver, heart, lung, bone mar-
row, and any other human organ or tissue as may be designated by the commissioner
but shall exclude blood. The term "valuable consideration" does not include the
reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation,
processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or the ex-
penses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in
connection with the donation of the human organ. Any person who violates this
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 1980) (emphasis supplied).
138. An Illinois statute was also in effect, prohibiting experimentation upon a fetus or in
vitro embryo unless the experimentation was "therapeutic." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-
26, § 6(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990). However, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois struck down the statute. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1363
(N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990). The statute was challenged in a class suit by
physicians specializing in infertility therapy. Id. The court held that the Illinois law was
unconstitionally vague because its failure to define "experiment" and "therapeutic" meant that
physicians could not be sure "whether certain procedures-such as chorionic villi sampling or
embryo transfer"-were illegal. Id. at 1372. The statute at issue specifically provided that in
vitro fertilization was legal in Illinois. Id. at 1363. The court also held that the statute's
prohibitions violated a woman's right to reproductive privacy. Id. at 1376. Since the decision
was silent on the issue of ex utero embryos, this holding can be dangerously broadened to
sanction unlimited in vitro research.
139. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade determined that, while the Constitution does not
have a specific guarantee for the preservation of privacy, it was necessary to make this right
fundamental in order to ensure that citizens had the ability to validate those rights specifically
guaranteed under our constitution. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). Justice Stewart's reliance on the
more basic notion of "liberty" is also applicable to the debate in this area. 410 U.S. at 167. In
either case, the embryo is unable to assert a right that the law has recognized for protection.
140. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Child-
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ble movement away from a perceived course of beneficial therapy directed at
the embryo's well-being to a de facto experimental trial by the attending
physician. 141 Fourth, implied consent, 142 used to secure "permission" for
medical interventions, is not consent at all but merely a construct for action
that is perceived to be justifiable while allowing "responsible" parties to di-
vine the subject's approval.
143
The following section proposes that the principle of informed consent is
weakened when applied to the creation of extracorporeal embryos because
an embryo cannot act upon this consent, and because it is dubious whether
the process of IVF is sensitive to the promotion of patient benefit. " In
addition, the processes of IVF and cryogenic storage (with the intention for
timely embryo implantation) are inherently dangerous and pose an unrea-
sonable risk to the embryo.
145
III. A NEW MODEL IN SUPPORT OF BENEFICENT ACTION
The premise that the medical community needs protection from the explo-
sive issues surrounding IVF and cryogenic storage has been viewed from two
perspectives. The medical community must first recognize the lack of con-
gruity between legal and medical perceptions of life and realize that these
concepts have been applied in different factual settings and under laws with
different sanctions. In addition, the medical community must be subject to
birth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 431 (1983). There still exists the specter that embryos could be
chosen for special characteristics as part of a program of eugenics. Id.
141. See, e.g., Jarrell, Gwatkin, Lumsden, Lamont, Boulter, Daya & Collins, An In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer Pilot Study: Treatment-Dependent and Treatment-In-
dependent Pregnancies, 154 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 231 (1986).
142. CHILDRESS, supra note 135, at 83.
143. Id.
144. Veatch, supra note 31, at 3.
145. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 648-49 (in vitro fertilization should be characterized as
experimental and its use should be limited). This view is in accord with the Catholic Church's
modern teaching on the new reproductive technologies. See Text of Vatican's Doctrinal State-
ment on Human Reproduction, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A14-17 (reprinting Instruction
on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain
Questions of the Day); see also Rhinelander, Vatican Ban Sidesteps I Procedure, Wash. Post,
Mar. 21, 1987, at B10, col. 6 (Vatican statement not condemning Gamete Intra-Fallopian
Transfer as a possible infertility therapy). For a survey of the Church's teaching on the status
of the human embryo, as well as a history of the doctrine of "ensoulment," see generally M.
COUGHLAN, THE VATICAN, THE LAW AND THE HUMAN EMBRYO (1990).
For an explanation of the potential harmful effects of the procedure on the embryo, see D.
GIESEN, supra note 3, at 649 (embryos can only be maintained for about two years in cryo-
genic storage). As further evidence of possible endangerment to the embryos, it has been
demonstrated that the process of cryogenic freezing can damage the cellular mechanisms re-
sponsible for cell cleavage, thereby retarding development. Bromwich, Cocyte Donation: Ethi-
cal Rather Than Practical Problems Need to Be Solved, 300 BMI 1671, 1672 (1990).
Dangerous Relations
tighter controls over the use of IVF.I46 Doctors can no longer hide behind
the shifting definition of viability as medical technology both increases the
survival rate of newborn humans 47 and makes advances toward the com-
plete artificial incubation of laboratory mammals. 141 Questions of viability
may not be applicable at all if it is recognized that the viability concept was
formulated with the balancing of rights between "two lives in one body."'
149
While the doctor's role of loyalty to the mother appears secure,' 50 there is
confusion in defining the relationship of medical practitioners to embryos
existing ex utero. The result can be unregulated paternalistic action by the
doctor when considering the disposition of a viable embryo.'"'
This paternalistic action was demonstrated in Del Zio v. The Presbyterian
Hospital.'52 In this action, the wife submitted to follicle aspiration in order
to obtain an ovum for subsequent uterine implantation. The attending phy-
sician, who had been conducting in vitro research, combined the collected
follicle fluid with the husband's semen in a test tube and proceeded to incu-
bate the mixture."' Prior to implantation, the chief of Presbyterian Hospi-
tal's obstetrics and gynecology staff ordered that the mixture be destroyed on
the basis of the hospital's prior agreement with the federal government that
no IVF would occur at the facility.' 54 The couple asserted claims of emo-
tional distress and tortious damage and alleged conversion of property. The
jury found the conversion claim to be too speculative and awarded damages
of fifty thousand dollars to the wife and three dollars to the husband for
tortious conduct causing emotional distress.' 55 Interestingly, at the time of
the trial, the test tube sample was actually frozen by the chief physician as
evidence, and no one was able to determine if an embryo had actually
146. See Robertson, In The Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV.
437, 483-515 (1990) (discussing state imposed limits on dispositional authority over embryos).
147. Special Project, supra note 40, at 630.
148. See Kass, supra note 12, at 22.
149. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 646. While Dr. Giesen proposes that the extracorporeal
embryo becomes an independent life in being upon separation from a supportive uterus, J.A.
Robertson asserts:
[T]he embryo does not have a moral status in and of itself, as it presently is, but does
have moral status if it might be transferred to a uterus and thus become a person.
When transfer does not occur and no duty is owed, decisions about embryos become
occasions to use embryos as a symbol of life or persons generally.
Robertson, supra note 33, 59-60.
150. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
151. CHILDRESS, supra note 135, at 55.
152. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1978), as cited in Powledge, A Report from the Del
Zio Trial, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15 (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter Powledge].
153. Id. at 15.
154. Id.
155. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 662 (footnote omitted).
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developed. 1
56
In the previous discussion of the in vitro subject as an autonomous being,
the principle of beneficence was contrasted with a general respect for the
autonomy of individuals. 1'7 While the notion of respect has at its core the
mandate to look to the subject's own wishes in an effort to avoid paternalis-
tic behavior,158 the medical practitioner is unable to apply this respect in the
case of the nonautonomous subject; the principle of informed consent has
not been adequately defined for the scenario of the IVF embryo.159
This current lack of definition also is reflected in clinical research policy
statements promulgated by representative bodies of the medical community.
The Declaration of Helsinki provides recommendations to guide researchers
in the use of human subjects in clinical and purely research trials. ' ° The
fourth canon of the section covering nontherapeutic research explicitly states
that "the interest of science and society should never take precedence over
considerations related to the well-being of the subject."' 16 1 However, in the
case of embryos like those in Davis v. Davis, there is a dramatic shift away
from such ethical guidelines because the Declaration was never intended to
apply to the problems surrounding IVF. The section on clinical research,
however, does disapprove of the use of subjects who cannot assert a desire to
be removed from the trial.
16 2
In the above analysis two incongruous results for the medical practitioner
are possible. The status of an embryo becomes equated with that of a criti-
cally ill patient who could be saved with available therapy, 63 or the em-
bryo's status is shunted to that of an incompetent individual who is subject
156. Powledge, supra note 152, at 15.
157. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
158. CHILDRESS, supra note 135, at 59-66.
159. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 38, at 79 (describing informed consent as
partitioned into five elements, each of which must be present in order for there to be valid
consent: competence, disclosure of information, understanding of information, voluntariness,
and authorization by the subject).
160. See CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 421-23 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds.
1989) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS].
161. Id. at 423.
162. Id. at 422.
163. See Duff, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 890 (1973); Engelhardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in BENEF-
ICENT EUTHANASIA 180 (M. Kohl ed. 1975); Roth, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treat-
ment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977). The case that most closely parallels this finding is
that which led to the implementation of the Baby Doe regulations and subsequent amend-
ments to the Child Abuse and Treatment Act which defined child abuse as the "withholding of
medically indicated treatment" from newborns. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10) (1988). The develop-
ment of the case and laws are chronicled with great clarity in Smith, Defective Newborns and
Government Intermeddling, 25 MED. SCI. & L. 44, 44-48 (1985).
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to medical experimentation through the substituted judgment doctrine.'
64
Given the claims of individual doctors that progress is presently being made
in fetal tissue research,' 65 there may be a trend toward ending the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) ban against federal funding of
such research.166 To focus the work of doctors and researchers away from
the needless creation of surplus embryos, the federal government should en-
courage limited research in IVF through renewed funding, 167 thereby giving
effect to the strict guidelines that are currently in place.'
68
164. Substituted judgment evaluates proxy decisionmaking in terms of the choice "which
would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into
account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which
would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent person." Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431
(1977). The Saikewicz court specifically claimed that the substituted judgment standard "com-
mends itself simply because of its straightforward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the
individual." 373 Mass. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 431. However, the extracorporeal embryo shat-
ters the substituted judgment paradigm because the embryo theoretically has the potential,
through implantation and healthy development, to become competent. In this case, it is the
responsibility of the dispositional authority "to keep as many as possible of a child's central
life-options open until the child become an autonomous adult himself." Feinberg, supra note
94, at 465.
165. See Redmond, Naftolin, Collier, Leranth, Robbins, C. Sladek, Roth & J. Sladek, Cry-
opreservation, Culture, and Transplantation of Human Fetal Mesencephalic Tissue into
Monkeys, 242 Sci. 768 (1988); Blakeslee, In Careful Test, Parkinson's Patient Shows Gains
After Fetal-Cell Implant, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1989, at C3, col. 1; Greenhouse, Scientist Says
He Transplanted Tissue Into Fetus, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1989, at B17, col. 2; Rohter, Doctor
in Mexico Defends His Innovative Transplant Procedures, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1988, at C3,
col. 1.
166. See Brahams, Fetal Spare Parts, 1 LANCET 424 (1988) (research should be allowed so
long as embryos not created for the sole purpose of research); Mahowald, Silver & Ratcheson,
The Ethical Options in Transplanting Fetal Tissue, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9, 10 (Feb.
1987) (procedures are justified by referencing the needs of treatment for Parkinson's disease as
a method toward supporting the autonomy of the chronically ill); Robertson, Rights, Symbol-
ism, and Public Policy in Fetal Tissue Transplants, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 10 (Dec.
1988) (Respect for the needs of sick patients conflicts with respect for prenatal human life; the
final result is "the specter of fetal tissue procurement leading to a commercial market in abor-
tions and in fetal tissue.").
167. See Krauthammer, Political Malpractice, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1989, at A27, col. 3.
For an analysis of the events leading up to the HHS ban on federally funded fetal tissue re-
search see Robertson, Fetal Tissue Transplants, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 443 (1988); see also Palca,
US. In Vitro Fertilization in Limbo According to OTA, 333 NATURE 388 (1988).
168. Part 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Protection of Human Subjects, provides:
§ 46.208 Activities directed toward fetuses in utero as subjects.
(a) No fetus in utero may be involved as a subject in any activity covered by this
subpart unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the
particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent neces-
sary to meet such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus imposed by the research is mini-
mal and the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
(b) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) of this section may be conducted
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However, any solution embodying the principle of autonomy must also
account for the subject's well-being. A statute adopted in Minnesota
presents a well-balanced approach by providing that an embryo cannot be
harmed in any way by the research. I This approach is consistent with the
medical reality that IVF technology presents a high degree of risk to the
embryo. 70  Thus, the only conceivable medical inquiry into the ex-
only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given their informed
consent, except that the father's consent need not be secured if. (1) His identity or
whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not reasonably available, or
(3) the pregnancy resulted from rape.
§ 46.209 Activities directed toward fetuses ex utero, including nonviable fetuses, as
subjects.
(a) Until it has been ascertained whether or not a fetus ex utero is viable, a fetus
ex utero may not be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this sub-
part unless:
(1) There will be no added risk to the fetus resulting from the activity,
and the purpose of the activity is the development of important bi-
omedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means, or
(2) The purpose of the activity is to enhance the possibility of survival of
the particular fetus to the point of viability.
(b) No nonviable fetus may be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this
subpart unless:
(1) Vital functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained,
(2) Experimental activities which of themselves would terminate the
heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will not be employed, and
(3) The purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedi-
cal knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
(c) In the event the fetus ex utero is found to be viable, it may be included as a
subject in the activity only to the extent permitted by and in accordance with
the requirements of other subparts of this part.
(d) An activity permitted under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section may be con-
ducted only if the mother and father are legally competent and have given
their informed consent, except that the father's informed consent need not be
secured if: (1) His identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained,
(2) he is not reasonably available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from rape.
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208-.209 (1989) (emphasis in original).
169. The Minnesota statute provides:
Subdivision 1. Whoever uses or permits the use of a living human conceptus for any
type of scientific, laboratory research or other experimentation except to protect the
life or health of the conceptus, or except as herein provided, shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.
Subdivision 2. The use of a living human conceptus for research or experimentation
which verifiable scientific evidence has shown to be harmless to the conceptus shall be
permitted.
Subdivision 3. Whoever buys or sells a living human conceptus or nonrenewable
organ of the body is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision
prohibits (1) the buying and selling of a cell culture line or lines taken from a non-
living human conceptus ....
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1986) (emphasis supplied).
170. See Testart, Lassalle, Belaisch-Allart, Forman, Hazout, Volante & Frydman, Human
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tracorporeal embryo could occur in a setting that contemplated the immedi-
ate implantation of the IVF embryo.17 1 Louisiana also protects embryos
through a statute that effectively prevents embryo abuse by physicians dur-
ing the period prior to implantation. 1
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Physicians can be encouraged to explore responsibly the mysteries of
human conception without compromising the principle of respect for all life.
This principle is founded upon the notion that the embryo ex utero should
be considered to have near perfect rights of personality. Such an approach
attempts to reconcile those who assert that society can be responsible in
managing IVF technology1 73 with fundamental principles governing the ex-
Embryo Viability Related to Freezing and Thawing Procedures, 157 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 168 (1987) (although frozen-thawed embryos had equal chances of postim-
plantation viability when compared to the performance of fresh, immediately transferred em-
bryos, these results could be achieved only by selecting those embryos that could withstand
cryogenic storage). The advances of this research have no moral foundation since it is possible
to fertilize a previously frozen ovum. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 640. In this way, the moral
dilemma is obviated because no independent legal significance attaches to an unfertilized
ovum, or for that matter, to other donated body parts and tissue. See Moore v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, reh'g denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 2975 (1990).
171. D. GIESEN, supra note 3, at 646. Dr. Giesen correctly states that nonimplanted em-
bryos should be protected in the same manner as those existing in utero. Id. Interestingly,
even Dr. Giesen's conservative approach is capable of conflicting interpretations because an
embryo in utero may legally be aborted within the parameters of the Roe trimester framework.
See text accompanying notes 41-49. This reality begs the question of whether the embryo
existing ex utero actually enjoys greater protection; the desire to protect this entity as an in-
dependent life is necessary to limit the bounds of possible dispositions by uninterested physi-
cians, researchers, and gamete donors.
172. The statute states in relevant part:
§ 123. Capacity
An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as
the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any other time when
rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with law.
§ 126. Ownership
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human being which is not the
property of the physician which acts as an agent of fertilization, or the facility which
employs him or the donors of the sperm and ovum. If the in vitro fertilization pa-
tients express their identity, then their rights as parents as provided under the Louisi-
ana Civil Code will be preserved. If the in vitro fertilization patients fail to express
their identity, then the physician shall be deemed to be temporary guardian of the in
vitro fertilized human ovum until adoptive implantation can occur.
§ 127. Responsibility
Any physician or medical facility who causes in vitro fertilization of a human
ovum in vitro will be directly responsible for the in vitro safekeeping of the fertilized
ovum.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123, :126, :127 (West 1989).
173. Smith, Intimations of Life: Extracorporeality and the Law, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 395, 396
(1985-86) ("If procreation continues to remain at the very center of a marital relationship and,
indeed, family the essence of a society that retains its vitality, new and even controversial
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tent of physician prerogatives in the research environment.17 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Only through a recognition by the medical community that IVF does not
represent one of many potential avenues for unlimited medical exploration
can the entire ethos of respect at the core of all patient-professional relation-
ships be preserved. While current indicators in American law point to a lack
of definitional guidance regarding the status of the extracorporeal embryo,
those legal concepts applied to other dilemmas at the beginning of life pro-
vide a roadmap for future reform. As technology moves toward the creation
of an artificial incubator for the term maturation of human life, the tempta-
tion to perfect the genesis of human life will lead inevitably to eugenics.
While the technology curve has yet to cast a shadow over our respect for the
mysteries of life, this potential for midwifery in the test tube must be halted
now.
The basis for this endeavor originates in a conviction that the interests of
individual liberty and of the accommodation of diverse social views are not
always inversely proportional. In the case of relationships between doctors
and their patients, the amount of good to be obtained from unlimited use of
IVF therapy and research pales before a stronger interest in promoting confi-
dence in the health care system and faith in those who practice medicine.
This is achieved by direct government participation in limited research in
which embryos are not harmed, rather than by uninvolved silence when the
call for encouraging beneficent action is unheard.
The importance of defining the parameters of justifiable action in IVF will
impact medical ethics in three ways. First, the trend of assessing a patient's
free choice by a sliding scale based on his or her current condition or level of
development will be reversed. Second, the new doctor-patient relationship
will yield a more consistent environment of mutual understanding where
both parties, or those with proxy responsibility, will be fully aware of the
demands that can be made in the clinical environment. Third, a re-evaluated
endeavors are necessary in order to assure this sort of marital fulfillment and societal success
and, thus, perpetuation." (footnotes omitted)).
174. See CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS, supra note 160, at 420. (Code of Nurem-
berg). The Code of Nuremberg demands that the clinician use subjects for research who have
the "legal capacity to give consent. ' Id. The possibility of proxy consent in the context of
embryos can be justified only if the proxies are obtained from the parents and the medical
inquiry is minimized so as not to endanger the embryo. Of central importance is the require-
ment that all parties intend immediately to implant the embryo. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS,
supra note 38, at 170-84; see also Protection of Human Subjects, HEW Support of Human in
Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Report of the Ethics Advisory Board, 44 Fed. Reg.
35,033, 35,057 (1979).
1991] Dangerous Relations 337
conception of state interests will no longer result in the unnecessary compro-
mise of individual autonomy for the sake of avoiding the dangerous slide
toward the active termination of "unworthy" life.
John Matthew Aragona

